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A driving factor in any open-economy macroeconomics model is the degree of inter-
national ﬁnancial integration. This suggests that understanding the sources of the recent
explosive growth in cross-border asset trade and the impact of the upscaling in gross and
net international investment positions on key open-economy macroeconomic variables such
as the trade balance and the real exchange rate is critically important for policy analysis.
Accordingly, the goal of this paper is to highlight some of the main results emerging from
this fast-expanding research ﬁeld.
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In this paper, I provide a selective overview of recent research on the spectacular growth in inter-
national ﬁnancial trade and its implications for the macroeconomic behaviour of open economies.
The motivation for this research topic is quite basic, in that a driving factor in any open-economy
macroeconomics model is the degree of international ﬁnancial integration. This suggests that
understanding the sources of the recent explosive growth in cross-border asset trade and the im-
pact of the upscaling in gross and net international investment positions on key open-economy
macroeconomic variables such as the trade balance and the real exchange rate is critically im-
portant for policy analysis. Accordingly, the goal of this paper is to introduce the reader to some
of the main results emerging from this fast-expanding research ﬁeld. However, it is beyond the
scope of this paper to provide a comprehensive survey of the literature: the following material is
intentionally selective and indeed heavily draws on my ongoing collaboration with Gian Maria
Milesi-Ferretti of the International Monetary Fund.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 surveys the determinants of the
growth in international ﬁnancial trade: both the scale of gross investment positions and the
emergence of large net foreign asset imbalances. The macroeconomic implications are explored
in Section 3, in terms of the impact of net imbalances on the trade balance, the real exchange
rate and real interest rate diﬀerentials. In addition, the potential impact of large cross-holdings
on patterns in risk-sharing, growth and business cycles is also brieﬂy reviewed. Section 4 oﬀers
some concluding remarks.
2 The Rise in International Financial Trade
In this section, we ﬁrst brieﬂy discuss data issues before turning to the empirical analysis of
gross and net foreign asset positions.
2.1 Data Sources
Data limitations provide one reason why quantitative analysis of international ﬁnancial trade
has been relatively limited. This is especially the case, if one wishes to focus on accumulated
stock holdings, rather than just examining international ﬁnancial ﬂows. Some countries (e.g.
the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada) have long provided high-quality national
data on foreign assets and liabilities. However, the International Monetary Fund only began
reporting the details of international investment positions for a small number of countries in
1997. Its coverage has broadened since then but, especially for developing countries, its data do
2not go far back in time.
To redress this gap, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001) set out to construct estimates of gross
foreign assets and foreign liabilities for a large number of industrial and developing countries over
1970-1998. In addition to the broad aggregates, the composition of the international balance
sheet (debt, portfolio equity, FDI) was also addressed. The stock estimates were derived by
cumulating gross ﬁnancial ﬂows but corrected for the valuation changes that result from move-
ments in ﬁnancial markets, currencies and price levels. Moreover, it is also important to allow
for once-oﬀ capital transfers and the impact of debt reduction and debt cancellation programmes
for some countries.
The importance of valuation changes in driving the evolution of net foreign asset positions
is well illustrated by Table 1 (adapted from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2001a), which shows that
the correlation between the current account and the change in the net foreign asset position is
typically far from unity. As such, the simplistic method of capturing net foreign asset positions
by simply cumulating current account imbalances can prove highly misleading.
2.2 Determinants of Gross International Investment Positions
As is emphasised by Lane (2000), Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001a, 2001b, 2003a) and Obstfeld
and Taylor (2003), the size of international balance sheets have grown very rapidly in recent
decades. Although many countries display net foreign asset positions that are close to zero, this
is consistent with having a large gross foreign asset position that is counterbalanced by oﬀsetting
gross foreign liabilities.
Even if net positions are small, large gross positions have important macroeconomic impli-
cations. First, the potential for international risk-sharing is largely a function of the scale of
international balance sheets. For instance, domestic risks can be partly laid oﬀ by issuing state-
contingent foreign liabilities – accomplished, for example, by the sale of domestic equities to
external investors. In the other direction, holding foreign assets provides diversiﬁcation, since
the returns on these foreign assets will be determined by external events. Of course, the precise
mechanics of risk sharing will depend on the composition of the international balance sheet as
between debt and equity-type investments and also on the mix between assets and liabilities that
are denominated in domestic currency versus foreign currencies.
Second, gross positions also aﬀect the relation between asset price ﬂuctuations (including
currency ﬂuctuations) and macroeconomic variables. The larger the scale of the international
balance sheet, the more important are re-valuation eﬀects. To give a simple example, if a country
holds $1 billion in dollar-denominated assets, it is much more exposed to shifts in the value of
3the dollar and in US ﬁnancial markets than if its position is only $100 million. In this way, the
growth in international ﬁnancial positions strengthens international linkages across economies
through this revaluation mechanism.
Third, international asset cross-holdings may also inﬂuence the determination of asset prices.
T ot h ee x t e n tt h a tw e a l t he ﬀects are important for asset pricing, the closer correlation in wealth
dynamics across investors of diﬀerent nationalities that is induced by greater international di-
versiﬁcation may also generate higher international comovement in asset prices.
Fourth, the internationalization of capital ownership may also have political economy im-
plications in that it may be increasingly diﬃcult to distinguish between domestic and foreign
owners of capital. In turn, this feeds into debates about optimal and feasible tax structures and
international regulation of corporations and ﬁnancial markets.
Finally, a high level of international ﬁnancial integration may also alter long-run growth po-
tential. This may be the case for a number of reasons. First, international risk-sharing permits
domestic investors to take on riskier projects that may promise higher returns. Second, the
internationalization of the capital stock may weaken incentives to over-tax or over-regulate in-
vestment. Third, the discipline eﬀect of open capital markets may also improve monitoring and
increase the eﬃciency of capital allocation. On the other side, however, a poor regulatory struc-
ture and/or an exposed external capital structure may adversely aﬀect economic performance
by permitting overborrowing and increasing vulnerability to output-destroying ﬁnancial crises.
For these reasons, it is important to understand the determinants of the scale and composition
of international balance sheets. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2003a) studied the dynamics of the
level of international ﬁnancial integration for a sample of industrial countries over 1983-2001.
The volume-based measure considered is
IFIGDPit =
(FA it + FLit)
GDPit
(1)
where FAit,FL it denote the levels of gross foreign assets and gross foreign liabilities respectively.
The growth in this ratio is modeled as
∆IFIGDPit = αi + γ ∗ Xit + β ∗ ∆Zit + εit (2)
where Xit,Z it are a set of country- and time-varying determinants. Table 2 shows the results for
a panel of industrial countries over 1983-2001. At a broad level, the most important covariates
of the growth in international ﬁnancial integration are: (a) the growth in international trade
in goods and services; (b) rising output per capita; and (c) domestic ﬁnancial and stockmarket
development. While the importance of each of these variables is intuitively appealing, an im-
portant direction for future research is to sort out the lines of causality in the dynamic relation
4between these factors and the growth in international ﬁnancial integration.
Drawing on Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2003a), Table 2 also shows that the external liberaliza-
tion index loses its explanatory power once other determinants are included in the speciﬁcation:
this is attributable to the fact that the process of opening capital accounts in the industrial
countries was largely completed by the end of the 1980s, whereas the most rapid growth in inter-
national ﬁnancial cross-trade took place in the late 1990s. The result that privatization, all else
being equal, is associated with a lower value of international ﬁnancial integration is somewhat
surprising: one candidate explanation is that the terms of privatization programmes favour do-
mestic investors and induce a greater home bias in investment patterns. In terms of composition,
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2003a) ﬁnd that the growth of the domestic stockmarket is the single
most important factor associated with an increase in the ratio of equity to debt positions in the
aggregate international balance sheet.
Employing the dataset developed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001a), Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti (2001b) ﬁnd that trade openness is highly important in explaining the level of aggregate
external liabilities for developing countries and also raises the ratio of equity to debt liabilities.
Another signiﬁcant ﬁnding from that study is that ratio of FDI to total private liabilities nega-
tively covaries with country size: smaller countries disproportionately rely on FDI as source of
external investment.
Clearly, much remains to be done to gain a comprehensive understanding of the growth in
international cross-border ﬁnancial holdings and the determination of the relative contributions
of debt and equity (both portfolio and FDI) in the overall external capital structure. As time
elapses and data collection eﬀorts intensify, more can be done to test various hypotheses about
this phenomenon. In one direction, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2003b) explore the geographical
composition of international investment positions, drawing on the recently-released Comprehen-
sive Portfolio Investment Survey that is coordinated by the International Monetary Fund.
2.3 Determinants of Net Foreign Asset Positions
Although much has been written about the cyclical behaviour of the current account, relatively
less is known about the long-run behaviour of net foreign asset positions. This is unsatisfactory,
since recent decades have seen the emergence of persistent net foreign asset imbalances that
represent signiﬁcant asymmetries in the world economy. As will be explored later in this paper,
non-zero long-term net foreign asset positions have implications for the behaviour of trade bal-
ances, real exchange rates and real interest rates. In addition, these asymmetries inﬂuence the
transmission of monetary and ﬁscal policies and the calculus involved in proposals to improve
5international policy coordination.
To gain some insight into the empirical determination of long-run net foreign asset positions,
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2002a) estimate a parsimonious ﬁxed-eﬀects panel model for samples of
industrial and developing countries. Three factors are considered: relative output per capita; the
level of public debt; and demographic structure. In general, we may expect a long-term increase
in output per capita to be associated with an improvement in the net foreign asset position –
savings may increase, while the decline in the domestic marginal product of capital may induce
a switch towards overseas investment. However, at least for developing countries, an increase
in output per capita may relax binding credit constraints, such that it permits an increase in
external borrowing – for these countries, the net correlation may actually be negative.
Public debt is included, since a failure of Ricardian Equivalence implies a ‘twin debts’ outcome
– the higher is public debt, the larger also is net external debt. Finally, demography may
inﬂuence the net foreign asset positions, both via its impact on the rate of asset accumulation
and also on the rate of domestic capital formation. For instance, a country with a large cohort
in the 40-65 age bracket may accumulate net foreign assets, as the savings rate increases in
anticipation of retirement and the investment rate falls on account of the relative scarcity of
young workers.
Based on Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2002a), Tables 3 and 4 report the results of the panel
estimation of the determinants of net foreign asset positions for industrial and developing coun-
try samples respectively. For the industrial country sample, Table 3 shows that that richer
industrial countries indeed have more positive net foreign asset positions, with the age proﬁle
of the population also exerting an inﬂuence and that higher public debt is associated with some
deterioration in the external account.
For the developing country sample, Table 4 shows that the relation between output per
capita and the net foreign asset position is in fact negative: higher output is associated with
an increase in net external liabilities. In addition, there is a high “pass-through” from net
government liabilities to net external liabilities. Both of these results are consistent with the
presence of external and internal credit constraints in developing countries. The demographic
structure of developing countries again turns out to inﬂuence the net foreign asset position.
Importantly, these long-run factors are important for the overall dynamics of the net foreign
asset position. Again based on Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2002a), Table 5 reports the adjustment
coeﬃcient from an “error correction mechanism” (ECM) representation
∆NFAit = −δ(NFAit−1 − NFA∗
it−1)+β ∗ Zit + εit (3)
where NFA∗
it is the desired long-run net foreign asset position and the control factors Zit (not
6reported) include innovations to the factors driving NFA∗
it and a lag of the dependent vari-
able.This simple ECM equation has good explanatory power: Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2002a)
show its capability to track actual net foreign asset positions for a wide range of industrial
countries.
In summary, this section has addressed the factors underlying the growth in the scale of
international investment cross-holdings and the determinants of net foreign asset positions. In
the next section, we ask whether the increase in gross and net international ﬁnancial trade has
implications for the macroeconomic behaviour of open economies.
3 Macroeconomic Implications of International Financial
Trade
In this section, we turn to drawing out the macroeconomic implications of the rise in internatonal
ﬁnancial trade and the emergence of large divergences in net foreign asset positions between
creditor and debtor countries. We ﬁrst consider trade balances before turning to real exchange
rates and real interest rate diﬀerentials. We then brieﬂy consider the relations between ﬁnancial
globalization and international risk sharing, long-run growth performance and business cycle
analysis.
3.1 Trade Balance Adjustment
For sustainability, the trade balance must adjust to reﬂect the value of the net foreign asset
position. Following Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2002a, 2002b), we can write the ratio of the trade






ft−1 + εt ≡ Ψt + εt (4)
where ft is the net foreign asset position, rt is the (common) rate of return on foreign assets and
liabilities and gt is the GDP growth rate. The disturbance term captures temporary deviations
from this long-run value, reﬂecting cyclical disturbances and shifts in the desired net foreign asset
position. If the rate of return exceeds the output growth rate (rt >g t), then a long-run creditor
country can run persistent trade deﬁcits, while a debtor country must run trade surpluses.
The trade balance adjustment that is required depends on the rate of return, which in turn
should reﬂect the composition of the international balance sheet. To develop this point, let us
now relax the assumption that foreign assets and liabilities earn a common rate of return. We



















t denote the rates of return on gross assets and gross liabilities (flt) respectively.
For a debtor nation, a larger trade surplus must be maintained, the greater is the positive
diﬀerential (rL
t >r A
t ). Conversely, a debtor country need not run a trade surplus at all if it
earns suﬃciently more on its foreign assets than it pays out on its foreign liabilities (rL
t << rA
t ).
For instance, a country that primarily issues foreign liabilities in the form of short-term liquid
debt securities but invests overseas in higher-risk higher-return foreign equity assets may ﬁnd
itself in this fortunate position.1
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2002b) conﬁrm that equation (5) has empirical relevance: they ﬁnd
that (tbt,Ψt) are cointegrated for a sample of industrial countries, with a growth in long-term
investment income or capital gains associated with a long-term decline in the trade balance. In
this regard, it is important to underline the importance of rates of return and growth rates in
intermediating the relation between net foreign assets and the trade balance: the cross-country
correlation between the ‘raw’ net foreign asset position and the trade balance is relatively weak,
in view of the substantial variation in rates of return and output growth rates. For instance,
drawing on Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2002b), Table 6 shows the variation in rates of return on
foreign assets and foreign liabilities for a selection of industrial countries over 1993-1998.
3.2 Real Exchange Rates
A classical principle in international economics is the “transfer problem”: a country that must
engineer a net resource outﬂow (e.g. war reparations or investment income payments to foreign
investors) may need an equilibrium real exchange rate depreciation in order to achieve the re-
quired re-structuring of the domestic economy. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001b, 2002b) provide
a range of estimates for the size of the “transfer problem” eﬀect and show that the magnitudes
are typically quite substantial, especially for the larger economies (US, Japan, Euroland).
Table 7 shows the baseline results from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001b) which models the
long-run CPI-based real exchange rate as depending on the net foreign asset position, relative
output per capita and the terms of trade. In column (1), all countries are pooled together,
whereas columns (2) and (3) report results for the separate industrial and developing country
subsamples. Across the speciﬁcations, a signiﬁcant association between net foreign assets and real
exchange rates is evident: more indebted countries have more depreciated real exchange rates.
1However, such a country may leave itself exposed to a ‘run’ problem if creditors refuse to roll-over the
short-term liquid liabilities.
8Importantly, the evidence in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001b, 2002b) is that the net foreign asset
position inﬂuences the real exchange rate via the relative price of nontradables: it cannot be
attributed to endogenous movements in the terms of trade. Further analysis in those papers
shows that the magnitude of the transfer problem intuitively covaries with country size: the real
exchange rate adjustment required for a large, closed economy is much bigger than for a smaller
externally-orientated economy (see Figure 1, derived from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2002b). For a
sample of industrial countries, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2002b) also take into account that rates
of return and output growth rates inﬂuence the required trade balance adjustment for a given
long-term net foreign asset position and show that this correction strengthens the estimated
relation between the trade balance and the real exchange rate.
3.3 Real Interest Rate Diﬀerentials
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2002a) also study the comovement of real interest rate diﬀerentials
and net foreign asset positions. In the portfolio-balance literature, it is hypothesised that a net
debtor country must oﬀer higher returns in order to induce global investors to hold its liabilities
(see Frankel and Rose 1995 for a review). Table 8 reports the panel ﬁxed-eﬀects results: in panel
A, all countries are included and the time dummies soak up the “world real interest rate” that is
common to all countries; in panel B, the dependent variable is the real interest rate diﬀerential
vis-à-vis the US. In some of the speciﬁcations, we also control for the level of public debt and the
rate of real exchange rate appreciation. The ﬁndings are quite suggestive: there is indeed some
support for a portfolio-balance eﬀect, with net creditor countries enjoying lower real interest
rates than net debtors. The negative cross-sectional correlation is also evident in the scatter plot
in Figure 2, also derived from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2002a).
In this subsection, we have focused on long-run relations in the data. Exchange rate adjust-
ment to long-run equilibrium is unlikely to be perfectly smooth. Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2001)
analyze a number of scenarios for the dollar correction required in the event that global in-
vestors turn against funding the US external deﬁcit. An important lesson from that research is
that the existence of nominal rigidities sharply magniﬁes the required scale of short-run nominal
depreciation in the event of a sharp reversal in capital ﬂows.
3.4 International Risk Sharing
As was highlighted in section 2, an increase in the scale of international asset cross-holdings might
be expected to lead to more international risk-sharing via a greater level of wealth diversiﬁcation.
Some studies have looked at this question in a partial and indirect manner by asking whether
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in a study of the Irish economy, Lane (1998) ﬁnds that indeed the net factor income outﬂows
are procyclical: GNP is less aﬀected by cyclical ﬂuctuations than GDP. However, for a broader
sample of OECD countries, Sorensen and Yosha (1998) and Lane (2001) ﬁnd little evidence of a
smoothing role for international investment income ﬂows.
A limitation of that approach is that risk-sharing may take place through the movements
of capital gains rather than via investment income. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2003a) show that
holding overseas assets indeed diversiﬁes against domestic ﬁnancial risks: although the correla-
tions are typically positive, the degree of return comovement is far from perfectly correlated. In
general, the capital gains component is far more volatile than the investment income component
in overall ﬁnancial returns, so that it is not too surprising that this factor is central in assessing
t h ed e g r e eo fd i v e r s i ﬁcation that is aﬀorded by international ﬁnancial integration. However,
Sorensen et al (2002) ﬁnd that the investment income channel also becomes stronger, the greater
i st h ed e g r e eo fﬁnancial integration: the capacity of investment income ﬂows to smooth GDP
shocks is increasing in the level of foreign asset holdings.
Of course, the ﬂip-side of acquiring insulation from domestic disturbances is greater exposure
to externally-generated shocks. As is highlighted by Begg et al (2002), the sharp reversals in US
equity markets and in corporate proﬁtability in 2000-2001 were quickly transmitted to Europe,
in part due to the rapid acquisition of US assets by European investors during the late 1990s.
It is also the case that ﬁnancial integration alters the allocative impact of ﬁnancial bubbles –
Ventura (2002) explores the inter-relation between bubbles and international capital ﬂows.
3.5 Economic Growth
During the 1990s, there was an extensive literature that attempted to identify the impact of cap-
ital account liberalization for economic growth, typically ﬁnding only weak eﬀects (see Eichen-
green 2002 for a review). In general, this is not too surprising since any positive eﬀect may be
over-shadowed in the data by the impact of growth-impairing ﬁnancial crises.
More recently, a number of studies have rather explored the relation between volume-based
measures of ﬁnancial integration and economic growth (Prased et al 2003, Durham 2003, O’Donnell
2003). These studies use variables similar to the IFIGDP measure deﬁn e di ne q u a t i o n( 1 )a b o v e .
Consistent with the earlier literature, the IMF study carried out by Prasad et al (2003) also ﬁnds
it diﬃcult to detect a strong and robust causal relationship between ﬁnancial integration and
economic growth. However, there is some support for nonlinearity in the relationship: above a
certain threshold level of domestic absorptive capacity, greater ﬁnancial integration does indeed
10deliver high growth and lower volatility if an appropriate policy framework is in place.
Overall, it is perhaps too early to reach ﬁrm conclusions about the growth impact of greater
ﬁnancial integration. As the robustness of domestic ﬁnancial sectors and regulatory institutions
improve and adapt to a globalized ﬁnancial system, the inherent capacity of ﬁnancial integration
to improve international resource allocation may come to the fore and deliver faster growth
to capital-importing countries. Moreover, as is highlighted by Gourinchas and Jeanne (2003),
the most signiﬁcant gains from ﬁnancial integration may accrue through indirect channels: for
instance, by shifting the domestic political equilibrium in the direction of a more investment-
friendly policy regime.
3.6 Business Cycle Analysis
Signiﬁcant non-zero net foreign asset positions also have implications for business cycles and the
analysis of macroeconomic stabilisation policies.2 Accumulated imbalances – regardless of their
origin – may be important, since exchange rate and asset price ﬂuctuations then also operate
via a revaluation channel on the value of foreign assets and liabilities. For instance, Benigno
(2001) shows that the business cycle response to shocks is quantitatively quite diﬀerent if the
initial net foreign asset position is say 30-50 percent of GDP rather than zero as is assumed in
most of the literature.
Moreover, the asymmetry created by non-zero net foreign asset positions also implies poten-
tially large gains to international policy coordination. In Benigno’s model, for zero initial net
foreign asset positions, the ﬁrst best can be well approximated a policy of targeting domestic
producer price inﬂation.3 However, such a policy induces excessive volatility in interest rates
and hence ineﬃcient cross-country wealth redistributions if initial net foreign asset positions are
non-zero and policy coordination in this case can substantially improve welfare.
Tille (2003) provides a simple example about the impact of increasing ﬁnancial integration
on the transmission of exchange rate movements. Consider two cases with the same negative net
foreign asset position of minus C =100 billion. In case A, foreign assets and liabilities are C =100
billion and C =200 billion respectively; in case B, these stand at C =1,000 billion and C =1,100 billion.
Let all foreign assets and liabilities be denominated in the domestic currency. A ten percent
appreciation reduces the value of foreign assets by the same proportion in both cases. However,
in case A, this translates into a wealth loss of C =10 billion, whereas it represents a wealth decline
of C =100 billion in case B : a very signiﬁcant diﬀerence, with corresponding implications for
2Lane and Ganelli (2003) provide a more extensive discussion of this issue.
3This is the optimal policy under complete ﬁnancial integration. If initial net foreign asset positions are zero,
it is also not far from the optimum with bond-only international asset trade.
11consumption and investment behaviour.
It should be recognized that a signiﬁcant net external liability position also leaves a country
vulnerable to a ﬁnancing crisis, which can in itself be a source of business cycle volatility. In
turn, a sharp turnaround in the trade balance may require a large real depreciation, especially
in the presence of nominal rigidities. Such sudden stops in capital inﬂows have been a recurrent
problem for emerging market economies in recent years.There is by now a large literature on the
macroeconomics of ‘liability dollarization’ in developing countries (see, amongst others, Devereux
and Lane 2003 and Lane 2003). However, as indicated in the previous subsection, a ﬁnancing
crisis scenario is also potentially relevant for major industrial nations such as the United States,
even if the currency composition proﬁle of foreign liabilities is less risky for these countries.
In summary, to fully incorporate the implications of growing international balance sheets
into the “new open economy macroeconomics” modelling framework, more attention needs to
be paid to the theoretical treatment of asset accumulation. It would be desirable to also allow
for international trade in equities in addition to trade in bonds, without going all the way to
a complete asset markets structure.4 In related fashion, it may also be useful to re-incorporate
portfolio-balance considerations into the baseline open-economy macroeconomic model.
4C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper has provided a tour d’horizon of some of the main research strands that have been
pursued in analyzing the macroeconomics of the recent rapid growth in international ﬁnancial
trade. As has been evident throughout the discussion, this research programme is quite imma-
ture. In part, this is due to the fact that the process of ﬁnancial globalization is still in its early
stages. As more data accumulates, more insights can be gained as to how macroeconomic rela-
tions are aﬀected by international ﬁnancial integration and how adjustment to larger net foreign
asset positions imbalances will play out. For these reasons, this is likely to be an extremely
active research ﬁeld in the coming years and one that also has high relevance for policymakers.
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Source: Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001a). CA is current account to GDP ratio; ∆NFA is ﬁrst
diﬀerence of the ratio of net foreign assets to GDP.
16Table 2: Determinants of International Financial Integration, 1982-2001
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
External Liberalization 0.29 0.06 0.04 -0.05 -0.06 0.08 0.05
(5.3)*** (.69) (.5) (.5) (.6) (.8) (.5)
Trade openness 4.18 4.95 3.08 3.89 3.29 2.72
(3.2)*** (3.7)*** (3.71)*** (4.5)*** (3.63)*** (3.01)***
Log GDP per capita 2.65 1.56 2.76 2.82 2.71
(2.5)** (1.97)* (3.51)*** (4.31)*** (4.06)***
Financial Depth 0.24 0.56 0.62 0.75
(1.58) (1.68) (1.88)* (2.37)**
Stock market capitalization 1.27 1.3 1.32 1.35
(5.86)*** (6.18)*** (6.35)*** (6.95)***
Cumulative privatization -1.65 -9.67 -9.92
(0.66) (2.66)** (2.87)***




Adjusted R2 0.17 0.35 0.39 0.69 0.72 0.7 0.7
O b s e r v a t i o n s . 7 87 87 87 2 6 4 4 9 4 9
Source: Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2003). External liberalization is an index of capital account
openness. Trade openness is ratio of exports plus imports to GDP. Financial depth is ratio of
liquid liabilities to GDP. Stock market capitalization is measured as a ratio to GDP. Cumulative
privatization is ratio of cumulative privatization revenues to GDP. Corporate tax rate is average
tax rate on corporate proﬁts. Investor protection is a dummy taking value 1 if a country has
introducted a law prohibiting insider trading and 0 otherwise. Fixed-eﬀects panel estimation
using averaged data for 1982-1985, 1986-1989, 1990-1993, 1994-1997, 1998-2001. White-corrected
t-statistics in parentheses.
17Table 3: Determinants of Net Foreign Asset Positions, Industrial Countries
(1) (2)
1970-98 Balanced
Log GDP per capita 0.91 0.94
(12.63)** (11.66)**




Adjusted R2 0.89 0.9
Observations 516 390
Countries 22 15
Source: Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2002a). Panel DOLS ﬁxed-eﬀects estimation. White-corrected
t-statistics in parentheses.
Table 4: Determinants of Net Foreign Asset Positions, Developing Countries
(1) (2)
1970-98 Balanced
Log GDP per capita -0.21 -0.26
(4.59)** (3.55)**




Adjusted R2 0.83 0.89
Observations 779 416
Countries 39 16
Source: Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2002a). Panel DOLS ﬁxed-eﬀects estimation. White-corrected
t-statistics in parentheses.




Adjusted R2 0.28 0.44
Observations 539 849
Countries 22 39
Source: Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2002a). OLS estimation, t-statistics in parentheses.
Table 6: Net Foreign Assets and Real Exchange Rates
(1) (2) (3)
All Industrial Developing
NFA 0.28 0.19 0.29
(7.98)*** (3.97)*** (6.56)***
YD 0.14 0.22 0.14
(3.15)*** (3.13)*** (2.57)***
TT 0.04 0.17 0.02
(1.21) (4.12)*** (.51)
Adjusted R2 0.52 0.44 0.42
Observations 1558 548 1010
Source: Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001b). Dependent variable is CPI-based multilateral real
exchange rate. NFA is ratio of net foreign assets to GDP; YD is domestic GDP relative to
basket of trading partners; TT is terms oftrade. Panel ﬁxed-eﬀects DOLS estimation. White-
corrected t-statistics in parentheses.
19Table 7: Rates of Return on Foreign Assets and Foreign Liabilities, 1983-1998
Real rate of return
Foreign Assets Foreign Liabilities
UNITED STATES 11.3 8.1














Source: Adapted from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2002b). Dollar-based real rates of return.
Table 8: Determinants of Real Interest Rate Diﬀerentials
A. Real interest rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
NFA/exports -1.06 -0.83 -1.36 -0.91 -1.5 -1.63 -2.87 -2.81
(2.6)* (2.0)* (2.48)* (1.66) (2.45)* (2.94)** (4.48)** (4.65)**
Public debt 3.82 7.1 2.98 3.56
(2.1)* (3.4)** (2.03)* (1.91)*
D(RER) 0.03 0.04 0.02 2.64
(1.2) (1.74) (0.9) (1.23)
Adjusted R2 0.5 0.56 0.36 0.39 0.54 0.59 0.43 0.46
C o u n t r i e s 2 12 1 2 1 2 12 12 12 12 1
Observations 462 410 362 336 442 410 358 336
B. Real interest diﬀerential
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
NFA/exports -2.54 -2.44 -2.73 -2.22 -2.57 -2.77 -3.19 -3.24
(5.41)** (5.5)** (4.3)** (4.58)** (4.03)** (4.27)** (4.83)** (5.52)**
Public debt 3.18 7.79 2.23 3.18
(1.76) (4.82)** (1.51) (1.67)
D(RER) -0.04 -0.014 0.012 0.015
(2.15)* (0.78) (0.54) (0.66)
Adjusted R2 0.58 0.59 0.6 0.64 0.6 0.59 0.63 0.67
C o u n t r i e s 2 12 1 2 1 2 12 12 12 12 1
Observations 423 403 344 338 416 386 340 319


















































Figure 1: Source: Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2002b). Scatter plot of estimated “transfer elasti-














































Figure 2: Source: Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2002a). Scatter of real interest rate against ratio of
net foreign assets to exports, average data over 1990-1998.
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